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Abstract
*
This paper provides a long-term historical and econometric account of the
way in which geography has shaped development in the Mexican states. The
emphasis is placed on the way in which the natural geography is reinforced
by political decisions, which configure the human geography of population
density, urbanization and public good provision, which in turn determine
income, growth and poverty. The paper presents brief historical instances of
how geography has determined prospects for development at different
moments in Mexican history. This anecdotal discussion seeks to highlight
the intrinsic link of geography with political institutions, which is central to
understanding the economic effects of geography. The paper then presents a
descriptive statistical and geographical profile of the relationship between
geography and development in Mexico. Econometric estimates of the effects
of geography on income, growth and poverty are used to decompose
regional inequality, separating the specific contribution of natural
geographic factors (climate, location and population density) as compared to
public good provision, in the form of urbanization and literacy, and political
arrangements, as reflected in the fragmentation of political jurisdictions. The
paper argues that the main channel through which geography affects
development is political. The fragmentation of political jurisdictions in the
form of municipal governments constitutes a proxy for man-made barriers to
geographic mobility, which explain the interaction between geography,
politics and development.
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Introduction
When Hernán Cortez was asked by Charles I of Spain to describe the new land he had
conquered, he is said to have taken a piece of parchment and crumpled it to illustrate the
rugged aspect of the landscape. Microhistorian Luis Gonzalez has argued that Mexican
history can only be understood as the stories of three hundred valleys that make up the
matrias, or motherlands, to which Mexicans really pay allegiance. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, dictator Porfirio Díaz was well aware of the power of geographic destiny
when he lamented, “poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the US.” Geography has
undoubtedly played a key role in the long-term economic development of Mexico, while
the influence of geography continues to be felt in contemporary patterns of development
such as the location of new industry in Northern mid-size cities, increasing migration flows
from Southern Mexico and the central high-plateau to the Northern border region and the
coastal areas, environmental degradation in some of the poorest regions in the South, or the
intricate flows of temporary migration to specific cities in the US from particular regions of
the country.
Despite its importance, the impact of geography on development has been little
discussed in Latin America or Mexico. This paper aims to provide some insight into the
relative importance of geographical conditions for Mexico’s long-term economic and
political performance. Political performance is central to the study because we believe
geographic conditions determine some of the configurations of political forces and
institutional arrangements that have led to particular economic policies, especially in the
realm of taxation and the fragmentation of political jurisdictions. Those policies, in turn,
hinder or promote economic development. We call those arrangements a country’s
“institutional ecology,” a system of interrelated institutions built over time to achieve
certain socially desirable purposes.
We are not, however, geographic determinists. Long-term processes of economic
development are not the product of one causal factor, but instead result from
multidimensional social, political and economic forces. Grasping those processes requires a
multidisciplinary approach, combining various theoretical approaches, and the interaction
of historical, social, political and economic evidence. We have chosen to put geographic
factors in a prominent position, however, in order to reassess their importance.8
Using data from Mexican states and municipalities, the paper tests some of the
hypotheses of Gallup and Sachs (1999), Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup (1998)
concerning the role of geography in development. We go beyond econometric estimates,
though, providing a long-term historical account of the process whereby geography shaped
political arrangements, which produced specific policies with clear developmental impacts
on the Mexican states. In particular, we believe that the fragmentation of political
jurisdictions in the form of municipal governments constitutes a good proxy that explains
the interaction between geography, politics and development.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of
several recent contributions to the theoretical literature on linkages between geography and
development. The section additionally explores the implications of the literature reviewed
for the Mexican case. Section 2 is also theoretical in nature, briefly sketching a General
Systems Theory model (drawn from Blum, 1999) to study the effects of geography on
development. The systems model suggests that the interface between geography and
development is to be found in the natural and “institutional” ecologies of society. Both
theoretical discussions seek to provoke thoughts on how to approach geography and
development, rather than providing a definite explanation of the causal linkages between
geography, political institutions and economic performance.
Section 3 presents brief historical instances of how geography has determined
developmental prospects at different moments in Mexican history. This discussion seeks to
provide evidence of the intrinsic link of geography with political institutions, which is
central to understanding the economic effects of geography. Section 4 presents descriptive
statistical and geographical evidence on the relationship between geography and
development in Mexico. Section 5 provides econometric estimates of the effects of
geography on income, growth and poverty. This section decomposes regional inequality in
Mexico, separating the specific contribution of geographic factors (climate, location and
population density). Section 6 explores the relationship between the fragmentation of
political jurisdictions in the form of municipalities, geography and development. That
section assesses the political channel through which geography affects development.
Section 7 provides policy implications and an agenda for future research.9
1.  Theoretical Linkages between Geography and Development
Geographic conditions have come to play a new theoretical role in explaining long-term
economic development and growth. A seminal contribution, still widely cited by economic
geographers, is Douglass North’s (1955) explanation of the way in which the resource base
determines possibilities for specialization in world trade. North’s initial insights were
subsequently developed mostly in an institutional direction, explaining long-term economic
performance as a consequence of political institutions protecting property rights and
generating competitive markets (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981; Landes, 1988).
However, North’s account of growth in the United States (1966) as a virtuous institutional
arrangement, whereby three regionally specialized economies were able to profit from trade
within a federal arrangement, gives a greater explanatory role to the resource base than his
later works. In fact, one of the main questions North (1990) poses in his Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance, regarding why the economic
performance of two seemingly similar countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the U.S. and Mexico, diverged in such a striking manner, can probably be best answered if
one combines institutional and geographical factors.
A variety of recent works by economists have explored the role of geography.
These include the influential papers by Paul Krugman (1991) that revived interest in the
role of geographic location in trade theory. In addition, several papers coauthored by
Alessandra Casella (Casella and Frey, 1992; Casella and Feinstein, 1991) have studied the
effect of political jurisdictions on the territorial distribution of economic activity; and, of
course, the booming literature on regional convergence has been motivated by Roberto
Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin’s (1994) empirical work on economic growth.
Environmental and weather conditions have additionally been highlighted in the recent
literature. Sachs and Warner (1995), for example, have called attention to the role of
droughts as a purely natural shock with momentous economic effects, particularly evident
in sub-Saharan Africa. Also in Africa, growth regressions have increasingly incorporated
aspects such as wars, economic and political conditions of neighboring countries,
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and characteristics of physical infrastructure, which are
geographically given (for a review, see Collier and Gunning, 1998). The recent papers in
the project on geography and economic development at the Harvard Institute of10
International Development (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999; Sachs, 1997; Radelet and
Sachs, 1998; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; and Gallup, 1998) have provided a more
comprehensive research agenda in these areas, and the recent IADB (1998) report on
inequality provides evidence of the importance of geography in the development of Latin
America.
In a more provocative approach, evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond (1997)
provides an explanation of how environmental geography has influenced societal
development throughout history. Diamond’s view is somewhat extreme when applied to
historical and social processes, but his main insight on taking geography as a serious barrier
or facilitating condition for human development is powerful, as his work convincingly
shows. On the environmental front, the Brundtland report some years ago was highly
influential in focusing questions of poverty and destitution as direct consequences of a
vicious circle in which destitution produces degradation of the environment and
environmental damage leads to further impoverishment of the already poor. This has made
scholars interested in poverty and destitution more aware of the conditions of the
environmental resource base (Dasgupta and Maler, 1995).
Geographical conditions do not change quickly, even though human transformation
of the environment can open up vast expanses of land to agriculture or cattle raising;
construction of roads and bridges might provide for the mobility of goods and services;
swamps are drained, rivers are dammed, forests are burned or otherwise cleared. In general,
however, geography remains very much the same in the short term, or at least in periods for
which reliable regional statistical information might be available. Some resources, like
minerals, are only exploited once a technology is found to process them. Some regions
might be physically isolated only because a road or railroad has not been built. In this
context, long-term performance must be measured not just in decades, but probably
centuries. Hence the Mexican case is discussed taking into account a long historical period
beyond that for which regional statistical information is available.
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) consider four areas in which geography might
play a direct role in economic productivity: transportation costs, human health, agricultural
productivity, and proximity and ownership of natural resources. In Mexico, the
performance of regional economies has been directly affected by analogous factors. Water11
and soils have determined the character of agriculture. Given the rugged topography and
the absence of internal waterways, communication across regions has depended on
transportation costs. In the colonial period, the location of mineral deposits determined the
most important axis of internal trade flows. Energy resources conditioned the location of
the first efforts at industrialization at the turn of the last century in the city of Monterrey,
where nearby coal was available, and oil booms have had definite regional impacts on the
industrialization of Veracruz during the 1910s and 1920s or in Tabasco during the last
decade. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger report not finding a direct effect of geography and
health variables that would explain the shortfall in Latin America’s economic growth
relative to Asia (1999, p. 27). However, it is likely that the level of aggregation of the
heterogeneous regions making up the large Latin American countries creates a fallacy of
composition that hides geographic effects that could be studied at the regional level.
Regarding indirect effects of geography on economic development, Gallup and
Sachs suggest that some economic policies, particularly tax policy, might be endogenous to
geography. In particular, they provide a model in which the “optimal tax is an increasing
function of transport costs, discount rate, and the probability of losing office; and a
decreasing function of total factor productivity and the responsiveness of growth to the tax
rate.” This means that predatory elites, which in Olson’s terms (1993) behave as roving
bandits, are more likely to be present when regions are isolated and when they face many
challengers. This is the pattern observed during the nineteenth century in Mexico.
Cacicazgos (domains of local bosses) emerged probably as a second best solution, through
which tax rates could be decreased because time horizons were long and the hold on office
was secured, but the arrangement depended on making a region relatively impermeable and
isolated. Internal tariffs (the long-lasting alcabalas in Mexico) might have been imposed
not as a source of revenue, but as a way to keep transport costs high and maintain the
caciques’ hold on power. The seemingly irrational economic policies carried out in Mexico
during much of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century regarding
internal barriers to trade might thus be endogenized as part of the natural configuration of
resources. In fact, the fragmentation of political jurisdictions in the form of municipalities
emerging in the early nineteenth century might be explained to some extent by geographic12
conditions, coupled with the ruler’s desire to establish internal barriers to the movement of
goods and services.
This leads to a major area of study related to trade liberalization. One of the central
hypotheses of recent studies is that a coastline allows for greater contact with other
countries, hence regions near the coast will tend to promote policies of free trade. In the
Mexican case, however, the coastline seems to have been of little consequence for trade
flows. This is explained first by Mexico’s tropical location, which until very recently made
most of its coastline highly unhealthy.  Tropical illnesses regularly decimated coastal
settlements, and as a result few towns were established in the lowlands.  Colonial Mexican
ports were few in number and primarily served the shrinking international trade between
the Spanish colonies in the Pacific area and the metropolis.  Second, trade within the
country did not proceed through the coastal waterways because its sparsely populated
coastlines and formidable mountain barriers blocked communication to the more populated
central high-plateau settlements.  However, a very different coastline has emerged in the
recent past, that of the border with the U.S. Although the Rio Bravo (known in the United
States as the Rio Grande) is not navigable, the quality of infrastructure in the US has
effectively transformed border cities into ports open to the global economy. The possibility
of trade in international markets constitutes one of the most important escapes from adverse
natural geographical conditions.
2. A Conceptual Model: Natural Ecology and Institutional Ecology as
Interfaces between Geography and Economic Development
The need to trace and explain the multiple pathways whereby geography influences
economic development requires the construction of a whole set of conceptual models.
Providing all the interlinked models highlighting different aspects of these influences is
clearly impossible. General Systems Theory (GST) allows, however, for this kind of
complex and interdisciplinary modeling endeavor.  From the simplest possible models in
GST—integrating various “inputs” of energy, materials and information, their processing
inside “black boxes” to produce the observable results, “outputs” consisting of the same
three kinds of elements—to the very detailed and sophisticated “flow models” necessary to
produce computer simulations, GST is a very useful instrument for understanding complex13
phenomena.  We thus draw from a general but simple model, provided by Blum (1999),
emphasizing “natural ecology” and “institutional ecology” as the interfaces between
geography and economic development.
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Figure 1 depicts both “natural” and “institutional” ecologies as the interfaces
between the territory (geography) and population (social interactions), which together
produce the phenomena we call growth and legitimacy.  These social products cannot be
well understood outside the innumerable and complex interactions occurring among the
different elements of the system. Such interactions include, among many others, the way in
which political processes are structured and boundaries between jurisdictions are created
and enforced, often following “natural” barriers; the way in which production is organized,
including the establishment of property rights over natural resources and raw inputs used in
the production process; and the way in which tax resources are extracted, usually by the
force of the state.
It is clear that in the long run humans are able to radically transform the natural
environment.  Not only are dwellings and roads built, rivers dammed, forests felled and
mineral resources extracted, but humankind has established various symbiotic relations
with other living species and thus multiplied its own effects on geographical features.
Intensive mining processes and extensive cattle raising during the 300-year colonial period
(1521-1821), for example, destroyed a large part of the original temperate forests existing
in Mexico.  Mezquite and low brush vegetation colonized large parts of the Northern14
region.  Land erosion proceeded at a fast pace around mining towns, and local rainfall
patterns changed during this period.  An even more dramatic transformation of geography
is observed in the central valley of Mexico.  Its originally numerous lakes were deliberately
drained to build Mexico City.  Even now, people are still alive who remember a time in
which rivers and creeks criss-crossed the Mexican capital and clear lakes surrounded the
growing metropolis, now a veritable ecological catastrophe in the making.  The “natural
ecology” or environmental interface is the conceptual surface at which geography and man
interact.  Though geography is usually the passive extreme of this relationship, natural
ecology is always interactive.
The other conceptual interface we need to consider is “institutional ecology.”  This
is the interrelated system of institutions built over time to achieve certain socially desired
purposes.  The institutional ecology comprises a large diversity of: a) institutions, formal
and informal, b) rules and meta rules, c) allowable group strategies and tactics, legal or
illegal, and d) social and individual interests that continuously interact, creating some kind
of stable equilibrium.  Institutional ecologies can be more or less dense, according to the
sheer weight of their different parts.  A denser ecology is that which has built over time
more institutions in a certain conceptual or real geographic space. A higher institutional
density correspondingly implies greater costs of constsruciton, maintenance and
transformation.
Institutional density implies “institutional inertia,” which explains the difficulty of
changing the setting as fast as conditions might require. A “lock-in” phenomenon occurs
that might explain the different paths historical societies have taken.  An institutional
ecology can also be considered more or less robust, which implies the system’s ability to
keep its coherence over time, and robustness appears to be a function of institutional
diversity. The number of municipalities emerging in the different regions in Mexico is thus
a proxy measure to assess institutional density and the diversity of institutional
arrangements emerging over time. In regions of recent settlement, where individual private
property rights over land were established and towns were sparse, few municipalities were
created. Where indigenous populations predated the institutional framework of the national
state, communal property rights existed and population density was high, large numbers of15
municipalities were the rule. The difference in municipal configurations in Mexico
reflected geographic, ethnic and political realities.
The interfaces of natural ecology and institutional ecology imply hidden and overt
costs for society.  Until recently, ecology was not even considered when national or
regional economic accounts were produced.  Environmental advocates have been able to
bring to the forefront the need to integrate into the process of economic accounting the
hidden—but not insubstantial—environmental costs.  When these are considered, a more
realistic evaluation of economic performance can be achieved.  On the other hand, the
institutional ecology costs have always been considered, though not formally, by decision-
makers.
For example, public good provision in Mexico has been hindered by the
fragmentation and dispersion of population, as reflected by municipal organization. It has
been obvious that institution building and its transformation imply real costs to society.
Though there are still no explicit and generally accepted methods to cost institutions,
neither for their  building or maintenance nor for the economic growth or stagnation they
produce,  the inclusion of both the ecology and institutional ecology costs is conceptually
necessary to provide a better context for the analysis of economic development.
Tax systems and tax structures provide one area where including both natural and
institutional ecology in the understanding of the development process might prove
particularly fruitful. Revenue extraction is one of the oldest problems rulers face, and the
natural and institutional characteristics of a given society might determine how this is done,
and more importantly, what consequences a fiscal structure has on economic performance
over time.
3. The Mexican Case: A Historical Account
A few historical instances for which good research and evidence exist illustrate the
interaction of geography and social activity, which produce ecological transformations and
facilitate policy decisions and institution-building. Over time, though, these processes
produce “lock-in” phenomena that persist for long periods even though conditions have
drastically changed.16
A first example comes from the extensive research carried out mostly by social
anthropologists (Palerm, 1952, Wittfogel, 1981, and Harris, 1985, among others) on pre-
Hispanic societies in the central region of Mexico.  Though their methodologies differ, they
have seriously considered the “Marxian” concept of the “hydraulic societies” as a
beginning point for their social analysis.  The existence of  numerous lakes in the Central
valleys of the Mexican high plateau and the urgent need to control the regular but
devastating floods that occurred, as well as use those same waters for irrigation, initiated a
process of institution-building that produced the societies the Spaniards found when they
reached Mexico in the sixteenth century.
Though these societies—the Aztecs, Mayans, Mixtecs, Zapotecs and Tarascans—
greatly differed among themselves, they all shared some social organizational
characteristics that were analogous to the classical hydraulic societies already being studied
in Asia.  All of these were “despotic” societies with large bureaucratic structures,
supported by a large mass of landless peasants working small, communally held plots.
These societies developed into centralized pre-states that depended on the tribute of many
conquered peoples. Though these cultures’ technology was primitive (e.g., metals were
unknown), their social institutions were not.   Great cities and large populations attest to the
efficacy of these institutional complexes.  As a result, the Spanish conquistadores were able
to adapt many of the indigenous institutions they found to the Crown’s and their own
purposes.  Thus, present-day Mexico cannot be well understood without considering the
institutional “lock-in” phenomenon.
The regions where these “semi-hydraulic” pre-Hispanic civilizations were
established, the Yucatan peninsula and the central valleys of Mexico, Michoacan, and
Oaxaca, remain to this day areas where “institutional density,” as measured by the number
of municipalities, is above the national average.  In these regions it is still possible to
observe some of the archaic institutions, adapted or not, to the present conditions of modern
Mexico.  For example, the ejido, the most common form of land tenure in modern Mexico
and a product of the 1910 Mexican revolution, is the direct descendant of the marriage of
the Spanish medieval ejido, common land assigned to the townships, and the pre-Hispanic
calpulli, state-held property worked by individual families.17
This communal form of land tenure has maintained its central purpose for over 700
years.  Though food production has been an important byproduct of this institution, its
central purpose has been to maintain control over the tens of thousands of peasant
communities that exist in Mexico.  Control of these populations originally was needed to
build and maintain the hydraulic infrastructure that pre-Hispanic societies and Colonial
Mexico needed for their survival.  When the natural ecology changed, the lakes were
drained  and the chinampas (floating gardens) became just a tourist attraction, however, the
institutions created a long time before remained and their original purpose was redirected to
serve new needs.
The PRI, the party established by the “revolutionary family” in the late 1920s,
successfully used the ejido to keep political control of the country for over 70 years.
Discretionary land distribution among poor peasants and the subsequent creation of new
ejidos has rooted the growing Mexican rural population to specific regions and transformed
them into clients, first of the local political “bosses” and then of the agrarian federal
bureaucracies developed to control and extract rents from them.
A second example of geography and development producing important institutional
changes can be found in the Bajio region of north-central Mexico during the early years of
the nineteenth century.  The region is a fertile valley traversed by the Lerma river.  The
land is mostly flat, and the region is relatively close to the mining towns of Guanajuato,
Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas and Pachuca.  Its population grew rapidly and
developed modern agriculture to feed the surrounding booming silver mining towns.  By
the end of the eighteenth century, the Bajio was the breadbasket of Mexico.  Thus we can
observe two very different economies symbiotically united in that relatively small area.  On
one hand there were the mining towns’ economies, sustained by the exploitation of silver
and subject to the rentier state.  On the other hand was a more modern agricultural economy
made up of  large private haciendas and small independent ranchers that were producing
agricultural value through their hard work and improved technologies.  These rancheros
were subject to a more limited and modern institutional ecology.
The Bajio’s independent agricultural producers depended on the continuous flow of
work capital provided by the Catholic Church, a large rentier with excess liquidity that
provided many financial services to society at a moderate rate.  The Church as a financial18
institution had a long term horizon, and its credits to the Bajio farmers were renewed
routinely.  However, in the early 1800s the King of Spain ordered the Mexican Church to
provide him with a “forced” loan to pay for the European wars in which he was engaged.
When the Church began to call in its loans, the Bajio was suddenly plunged into a liquidity
crisis, and tens of thousands of modern agricultural producers were left financially exposed,
with resulting discontent throughout the region. Many Church leaders sympathized with
them, and a potent revolutionary brew began to boil.  Thus the war of independence had
found a fertile ground in the Bajío, the crossroads of two different economies, the rentier
and the modern limited.  Those individuals used to working under a modern limited
institutional ecology would not readily accept the heavy-handed approach of the rentier
state structure.  Significantly their battle cry was “Long live the King, down with bad
government.”
This conflict, between a heavy-handed rentier state and social and economic agents
developing in a more modern limited institutional ecology, has been a constant in Mexico’s
modern history.  Though in many aspects different, the 1910-20 Mexican revolution
showed an eerie similarity to the underlying causes of previous social conflicts.  In this
second “revolution,” modernizers (Monterrey’s new industrialists, Sonoran export-oriented
ranchers, discontented Northern politicians, labor unionists and the incipient urban middle
class) teamed with “archaists” in Veracruz, Morelos and Oaxaca, who longed for a more
simple and community-oriented society, to disrupt an institutional setting that either was
not modern enough or too modern for the vastly different communities and populations
comprising the Mexican nation.
As early as 1915, still in the midst of the armed phase of the “revolution,” land
reform laws began to be enacted in northern Mexico, especially the Gulf and Pacific coast
areas, where the land’s natural conditions allowed for modern export-oriented agriculture.
The overt purpose of these early statutes was to promote the modernization of agricultural
processes and increase their general productivity by dividing the mostly underdeveloped
latifundia and distributing unproductive surplus lands among the peasants mobilized by the
revolutionary armies, thus promoting the colonization of the barely populated North.  This19
first phase of the agrarian reform
1 was led by a heterogenous group of revolutionary leaders
who originated mostly in Mexico’s northern region.  These northerners took control of
Mexico until 1934, when Lazaro Cárdenas assumed the presidency. The second phase of
the agrarian reform began during the 1930s. Different purposes were behind the enactment
of the later agrarian reform laws, which were designed mainly for Mexico’s relatively more
populated central area.  In this phase, the federal government wanted to achieve two main
purposes: 1) to mobilize rural resources, capital, entrepreneurship and labor to the urban
markets to boost the industrialization program being developed, and 2) to establish an
efficient  corporatist structure of political control over the large peasant population.
Thus, the Mexican agrarian reform really comprises two different sets of
phenomena and policies, originally designed and implemented by two different political
groups and attuned to two different natural and institutional ecologies.  It served different
purposes and affected Mexico’s development in different ways.  While a strong case can
probably be made regarding the impact of specific geographical conditions on the agrarian
policies implemented in Mexico throughout the past four centuries, this impact seems
especially clear in the two post-revolutionary phases of land  reform, whether in terms of
tenure or distribution.
Mexico is still torn by the conundrum of its enormous geographical differences and
the “locked-in” rentier institutional ecology that has developed over the centuries.  The
costs of transforming this institutional setting are enormous, although not transforming
them can be even more costly in terms of the “natural ecology” disaster that is emerging
and the opportunity cost of development not achieved because of the many barriers and
obstacles generated by existing institutions.
                                                          
1 Although a very early program of land distribution was enacted in the central states of Morelos, Mexico and
Tlaxcala to provide land to the peasant rebels that formed the bulk of Emiliano Zapata’s army, land reform in
the early stages was attuned to the needs of development of Northern Mexico.20
4. The Mexican Case: A Statistical and Geographic Profile
Most of Mexico is a tropical country characterized by great regional diversity, a landscape
of natural barriers between regions, and a very dense institutional ecology. The 3,000 km
border with the US makes the country unique in that flows of trade, migration and goods
and services in general are largely determined by the rich neighbor to the North. The stable
political arrangements that have characterized Mexico over much of the last 500 years have
been historically punctuated by periods of upheaval. Notwithstanding wars of
independence, reformation, the revolution, and the Cristero movement, political institutions
have been extremely resilient to change, particularly in terms of informal practices that are
still observed, mostly in some of the less developed regions. This is the “institutional
ecology” in the country, which was briefly discussed above.
In relation to weather, the most prominent feature of Mexico’s geography is the
wide variation in rainfall, temperature and climates characterizing the country. The maps in
Figures 2 to 4 depict the geography of average temperatures, average rainfall and climates
in Mexico. These climatic profiles are also related to the nature of the terrain, with
mountain ranges running North to South on both the East and the West, creating a
temperate central plateau, which can be clearly distinguished from the tropical and semi-
tropical coast and the desertic North. We can thus think about the country as divided into
three major geographic areas: tropical coastal regions, the dry and warm North, and the
relatively temperate central highlands.21
Figure 2. Average Rainfall (in mm)22
Figure 3. Climates (Hot, Dry and Temperate)23
Figure 4. Average Temperatures (Centigrade Degrees)24
This variation of climates might be related to GDP by state. Tables 1-5 provide
calculations of the 1997 per capita GDP (in 1996 pesos) for the Mexican states according to
latitude bands, temperature, range of average rainfall, GDP per square kilometer and an index of
trade mobility.
2 Latitude bands, temperature, average rainfall and surface data come from INEGI,
while the index of trade mobility is calculated by Díaz Cayeros (1995). Since there is no single
statistic that best summarizes geographic variables (the mean, median or standard deviation do
not fully capture the distribution underlying those natural features) we present ranges of those
variables. Hence Table 1 provides a summary of how Mexican GDP is distributed according to
various criteria of ranges of latitude bands, monthly variability of temperatures and rainfalls in
the capital city of each state and a trade mobility index calculated as the combination of paved
roads, railroad tracks, and number of cars circulating (aforo vehicular) per square kilometer.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Mexican State GDP by Various Geographic Factors
(per capita pesos of 1996)
Latitude
Bands
28-32 24-28 20-24 16-20
7,555.7 9,466.2 6,479.9 9,066.9
Temperature 10-18 °C 10-26 °C 18-26 °C 26°C  or
more









8,592.0 7,842.9 10,000.3 5,443.8
Trade
mobility
0-15 15-25 25-35 35 or more
7,267.7 7,662.3 4,831.3 7,148.2
Source: Authors’ calculations. See Appendix.
There is no obvious North vs. South, hot vs. cold or wet vs. dry pattern, but it turns out
that the lowest GDP tends to be found in the center South of the country; temperate regions are
the richest, followed by the hottest tropical areas (which happen to be the oil-producing states of
Campeche and Tabasco). Richer regions seem to be found in places with either little rainfall, or a
moderate range; while the highest rainfall regions are the poorest. In terms of a man-made
geographic feature, which is the index of trade mobility measuring the density of highway and
                                                          
2 Lacking official recent data, GDP figures come from an estimate by Díaz Cayeros (1997).25
railroad tracks coupled with vehicle circulation, there is no specific pattern, except perhaps that
some regions in the central highlands, which are endowed with relatively good infrastructure, are
relatively poor (Puebla, Hidalgo, Guanajuato).
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger(1999) argue that population density is one of the features
that might account for economic development, in terms of a tendency to find population
concentrating or migrating towards temperate climates, close to the sea or navigable rivers.
Population density varies greatly among Mexican states, ranging from more than 4,000
inhabitants per square kilometer in the Federal District to a little over 5 in Baja California Sur.
GDP density, calculated as GDP per square kilometer in Mexico is not distributed according to
the world patterns reported in Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999), but is rather concentrated in
the central highlands of the country. The states of Mexico and Morelos, both adjacent to Mexico
City, head the list, followed by the smallest states which, except for Colima, are also in the
highlands: Aguascalientes, Tlaxcala and Queretaro. The next states are all large, but are also
characterized by concentrating economic activity: Nuevo Leon, Puebla, Jalisco, Hidalgo and
Veracruz. In the case of Mexico population density and GDP density do not seem to account for
economic growth patterns but are instead mostly the consequence of the process of centralization
of resources around Mexico City. As will be discussed futher below, econometric estimates
failed to find an explanation for GDP density other than the degree of urbanization characterizing
a particular state.
Having provided this brief sketch of geographic features, we believe it is important to
provide some quantitative sense of how important the “natural ecology” of Mexico is for the
economy. Until recently it was difficult to provide anyestimates of the way in which the
development process in Mexico is related to the natural resource base. However, INEGI has
recently produced a system of environmental national accounts (Sistema de Cuentas Económicas
y Ecológicas de México 1988-1996) which provides some insight into this specific aspect of the
interface between geography and development. We want to stress the issue of the natural
resource base and environmental degradation because, although this is not really incorporated
into the analysis that follows, we believe it is a way to quantitatively measure the impact of the
natural ecology and geography in the development process. Keeping detailed environmental
national, state and even municipal accounts should be a basic activity of government.26
Table 2 provides the physical balances of natural resources in Mexico between 1988
and 1996 according to INEGI. The last column shows the relative change in the stocks or
flows, which is the physical environmental cost of economic growth, both from depletion of
resources and degradation of the environment. INEGI calculates this cost for 1996 at
$258,366.9 million pesos, which is around 10 percent of conventional GDP.
Table 2. Physical Natural Resource Balances (1988-1996)










Million cubic meters -4034 -5628 3.39
Air pollution Thousand tons 26266 37523 4.56
Earth pollution from
municipal solid waste
Thousand tons 19142 31368 6.37
Water pollution Million cubic meters 16652 18415 1.27
Soil erosion Thousand tons 403302 616256 5.44
Source: INEGI (1999), Cuadro 1.
It is clear from Table 2 that some of the resources that are being depleted or degraded
represent major sources of economic growth and sometimes government revenue. Oil reserves
are the most obvious example, while water and soil, subject to pollution and erosion, are less
obvious. From the percentage changes, however, one can note that municipal solid waste and soil
erosion are advancing at very high rates, which will eventually have an impact on municipal
finances and agriculture production. Since these statistics are relatively recent they do not reflect
the previous degradation of forests which occurred for decades (if not centuries, as reflected in
the previous section’s discussion of the Bajio), which in turn promotes soil erosion and reduces
water recharge.
Unfortunately, information on deforestation and depletion of mineral resources is not
available at the state level, which might make it possible to assess the impact of environmental
degradation and depletion on a state’s growth. There are some cases, though, such as oil in
Campeche and Tabasco or forests in Michoacan, where such a relationship would probably be
found.27
The lack of state-level data notwithstanding, Table 3 provides at least some indicator of
the economic cost of the natural ecology, according to economic sector, as measured by INEGI.
Regions where an economic sector with high costs to the natural ecology is more prominent are
more likely to be basing their growth on geographic rather than other factors of production. The
table shows sectoral GDP and INEGI calculation of the Net Domestic Environmental Product
(NDEP), which is GDP minus depreciation (hence Net), minus environmental degradation and
depletion (hence environmental). The figure also reports the environmental cost and what it
represents as a percentage of GDP.
Assuming these costs are distributed relatively evenly across states, it is clear that those
states whose GDP relies most on mining or on electricity, gas and water are those whose growth
is most affected by environmental degradation. Chiapas would be the most clear example of this.
States more oriented towards manufacturing and services would incur less costs, although costs
in transport, storage and communications are probably highly correlated with manufacturing and
services. Nuevo Leon would provide an example of such a state.





















91,899.3 49,464.9 22,429.9 24.5
Mining 29,071.5 10,449.9 9,782.0 33.7
Manufacturing Industry 350,155.6 276,357.9 6,454.8 1.8
Construction 68,358.1 55,977.0 75.4 0.2
Electricity, Gas and Water 21,331.4 6,962.6 7,160.2 33.6
Commerce, Restaurants and
Hotels
351,744.6 336,957.7 0 0
Transportation, Storage and
Communications
168,082.9 30,362.4 121,448.3 72.2
Financial Services,
Insurance and Real Estate;
Social, Communal and
Personal Services
598,191.4 503,346.4 30,763.3 5.1
Total 1,678,834.8 1,428,063.2 198,113.8 11.8
  Source: Authors’ calculations, based on INEGI (1999), Cuadros 4-12.28
Further research would be needed to disaggregate INEGI information by state in order to
calculate NDEP by state, and hence better understand the dynamics of growth as related to
deterioration and depletion of the environmental resource base. Furthermore, it would be
important to calculate what percentage of government revenues are accounted for by the loss of
the natural ecology. However, this first analysis of the data tells us that there might be a very
strong relationship between the exploitation of the natural resource base and the process of
development (or underdevelopment, if there is such a thing as a vicious circle of poverty and
environmental degradation, as suggested by Chiapas).
We now turn to whether there are significant relationships between location, climate and
other geographic factors and the process of development in Mexico from a state cross-sectional
point of view.
5. The Effects of Geography on Income, Growth and Poverty: A Regression
Analysis
Does geography influence income, growth and poverty? This section tests some hypotheses for
the correlates of geography with development in Mexico. The main findings suggest that,
although the role of geography is limited, a fair amount of regional inequality in Mexico is
attributable to natural conditions and the social and political environment that reinforces such
natural conditions. Moreover, since poverty is concentrated in risky environments, where
geographic conditions are most precarious, the findings suggest that man-made changes in the
environment might make living conditions less precarious (such as building a highway in order
to improve mobility or introducing health facilities in humid tropical zones prone to infectious
diseases). We measure development through four indicators: official INEGI per capita state GDP
for 1993 and 1980, GDP growth between 1950 and 1993, and poverty in 1995, measured as the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index with a poverty line set at two minimum wages.
These indicators attempt to measure the level of development in a traditional closed
economy relying on natural resource growth during the oil boom (1980 GDP), the patterns of
regional income disparity in the midst of the economic transformation from a closed to an open
economy (GDP in 1993), a long term indicator of household well-being that can reflect long term
effects of regional inequality (moderate poverty levels in 1990), and the differential pace of
modernization in different regions across the country (growth). Growth performance is quite29
distinct from the first three indicators, since it captures a dynamic aspect of development, while
the indicators of development levels reveal cross-sectional variation among regions in Mexico.
As one could expect, controlling for other relevant variables, including the initial level of GDP,
this is the indicator that is least explained by geographic features.
These development indicators are regressed using geographic independent variables such
as average temperature and rainfall, kilometers of coastline, population density, and the number
of political subdivisions in the state as expressed in municipalities, which we believe is a proxy
for geographic fragmentation. Throughout, we control for sociodemographic changes, as
reflected in literacy levels and urbanization, in order to separate the effects of the “natural”
environment from a conventional modernization account of regional disparities. The section ends
by performing an exercise that decomposes regional inequality, measured through the Gini
coefficient, in terms of the determinants produced by the regression coefficients. Climatological
features are calculated from INEGI data, using averages for time periods that differ in each state,
but usually range from 30 to 40 years, averaged over the weather stations located in the state.
Economic data come from INEGI, while the poverty index was calculated by CIDAC from
census data.
3
The level of aggregation of the data is relatively high at the state level. This limits both
the scope of the inferences and the confidence in the statitistical results. The degrees of freedom
are given by the number of Mexican states (31, minus three missing data states in the Yucatan
peninsula, for which climatic data was unreliable). However, under different specifications,
geographic variables remained important determinants of regional disparities. While a more
detailed study would need to work at the municipality, locality or even AGEB (basic
geostatistical units defined by INEGI) level, our findings suggest that the geographic differences
in Mexico are stark enough so as to uncover some regularities even at this, admittedly high, level
of analysis. All estimates are Ordinary Least Squares regressions with standard errors corrected
for heteroskedasticity.
                                                          
3 It was impossible to locate reliable climatic data for the states of Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, so they
are excluded from this analysis.30
a)  State GDP Levels in 1993
Table 4 presents a first set of estimates for the geographic determinants of the level of per capita
GDP in the Mexican states in 1993, measured in natural logs (LGDP93). The first equation
includes the independent variables of climate and location, given by the average rainfall and
temperature as measured in the meteorological stations found in each state over the last 30 years;
kilometers of coastline; population density (measured as inhabitants/km); and a dummy variable,
BORDER, for a state on the U.S. border.
4 The functional form for rainfall and temperature is
quadratic, since a graphical inspection of the data reveals a non-linear relationship, whereupon
both high and low levels of rainfall are associated with higher income levels.
5
Table 4. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels, 1993
Dependent Variable: LPIB93





































































F 4.08 6.55 13.32 19.96 11.87
R2 0.4349 0.4964 0.7073 0.7416 0.7877
              T-statistics in parenthesis, n=29.
Rainfall and temperature seem to behave according to a U-shaped pattern, in terms of the
signs of each variable, but they fail to reach statistical significance. Among the location
variables, the border dummy has a powerful effect on income levels. The coefficients suggest
                                                          
4 The Appendix shows the effect of using the variable LANDLOCK for a state having no connection with the
coastline or the borders
5 Unreported estimates were also carried out with various measures of dispersion (standard deviation, coefficient of
variation) and the median of the temperature and rainfall variables, but they failed to reach statistical significance.31
that the border location increases income by 0.43. Given the range of variation in the dependent
variable (which goes form 1.5 to 2.2), this implies that, ceteris paribus, if a state is located on the
border it will not fall into the poorest 20 percent of the distribution of Mexican states. When
population density and urbanization are taken into account, as in equations 3-5, the border is no
longer a determinant of income. The COAST variable is positive but not significant, suggesting
that access to the coast might be associated with higher incomes. However, this variable fails to
reach significance under almost all specifications, as shown in the Appendix.
Table 5.1 in the Appendix shows shows that results for equation 1 hold when the COAST
variable is dropped, and that the effects remain when BORDER is substituted for the dummy
variable LANDLOCK. The signs suggest that landlocked states would have lower incomes,
although the effect is smaller than with border states, and the significance of this variable is
suspect. In fact, what is probably happening is that landlocked states only seem to be poorer
because they are not on the border, and the really important location variable is the border with
the U.S. Table 5.1 also shows that effects (and sizes of the coefficients) remain basically
unchanged in a specification only containing the variables that are sometimes significant, namely
rainfall (and its square), border and population density. This specification provides the baseline
regression, reproduced in Table 4 as equation 2, to which we incorporate urbanization effects,
quality of infrastructure, human capital, and finally the number of municipalities, which we
believe is a central determinant of income levels due to a historical lock-in.
The first human modification to the natural environment is created by cities and their
accompanying public goods. In cities radical transformation of the natural ecology take place,
when water, sewage or electricity are introduced. Equation 3 provides an estimate of
urbanization effects on per capita GDP, controlling for geographic variables in the baseline
regression. The sign of the urbanization variable, defined as the percentage population living in
localities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, is positive, which suggests the higher the income, the
more urbanized the state. Such a result is hardly surprising. The difficulty with this finding is
understanding which aspect of urbanization is relevant to generating higher incomes.
6
                                                          
6 Given the extremely high significance of the urbanization and land density variables, an additional test suggested
by John Gallup would be to find out whether geographic variables, particularly those related to climate and location,
explain GDP density, which is the product generated per square kilometer. We have found, however, that GDP
density in Mexico is randomly distributed in terms of climate and location; although it is higher where population is
more concentrated, which in Mexico happens to be the central highlands.32
As Table 5 shows, urbanization is highly correlated with measures of public good supply
(percentage of homes with electricity, water and sewage) and human capital (such as total adult
illiteracy, female illiteracy or the percentage of the population which speaks only an indigenous
language). Given the multicollinearity problem involved in putting all these variables in the same
estimate, we provide other estimates in Table 5.2 in the Appendix, using specifications which
provide the same basic message: these variables are always significant and with the correct signs,
in terms of better infrastructure being found in the richer states. The causality of the second
observation is obviously complex, since it could well be that those regions have better services
precisely because they are rich (this issue is further discussed below).
Table 5. Correlation of Infrastructure and Human Capital Variables
Elect Agua Dren Urban Illite
Elect 1
Agua 0.8407 1
Dren 0.7332 0.7096 1
Urban 0.7516 0.7852 0.7234 1
Illite -0.7245 -0.8095 -0.7468 -0.7621 1
Illfem -0.7243 -0.8097 -0.7295 -0.7413 0.9941
Table 5.3 in the Appendix provides estimates of the effects of  human capital, measured
by female illiteracy (FEMILL) and percentage of the population that only speaks and indigenous
language (LENGUA).
7 Equation 4 shows that when the human capital variables are introduced,
the explained variance increases to almost 74.16 percent, slightly above the infrastructure
variables. Nonetheless, while geographic variables alone accounted for 43 percent of the
variance in income levels across Mexican states, an improvement to around 71 percent is
achieved with the infrastructure variables.
8
A last set of income level regressions, found in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 in the Appendix, deals
with the number of municipalities in each state. We believe the number of municipalities is a
good proxy for a geographic component, namely the division of the territory into valleys
delimited by mountainous natural boundaries, combined with the role of political jurisdictions
                                                          
7 Estimates (unreported) were also done with an index of human capital measured as primary and secondary school
enrollment and with total adult illiteracy, which yielded the same basic results.
8 Unreported regressions of the income levels only with the urbanization variable and one of the quality of
infrastructure variables, excluding geographic determinants, account for around 30 percent of the variance, which
seems consonant with this improvement.33
and a historical lock-in effect of rulers attempting to produce internal borders in order to prevent
exit. Such internal borders, we believe, limit trade and enhance the predatory power of the ruler,
thus hindering growth and development.
The specification of the variable “number of municipalities” was tried by using first the
absolute number (MUNIC), then municipalities per capita (MUNPC), and finally the number per
square kilometer (MUNKM). In all cases the geographic variables and urbanization were kept in
the regression, plus a control dealing with indigenous populations or female illiteracy, both of
which are highly correlated (ρ =0.8435). The reason to include the human capital control in the
version that most reflects the indigenous component is that we want to ensure that the municipal
variable is capturing something other than the fact that states with more indigenous population
(namely, Oaxaca, Chiapas and Puebla) also have more municipalities.
The number of municipalities in the different measurements always had a negative effect
on income levels and was mostly significant. The exceptions occurred in cases where female
illiteracy was included as a control; this probably reflects the fact that the most isolated
communities, with female illiteracy rates as high as 90 percent at the municipal level, are found
precisely in the rugged states with the most municipalities. The correlation between the variables
is relatively high (p=0.5662). The fit of the regressions improved as the number of municipalities
was adjusted first by population and then by territory. In fact, the variance accounted for by
incorporating number of municipalities went all the way to 79 percent.
An issue that must be addressed regarding the municipal variable is whether there is an
endogeneity issue generated by a notion that regions with higher population growth and that are
more densely populated might become impoverished due to degradation of the natural resource
base. It could also be considered that the fragmentation of political jurisdictions could be the
consequence of low income levels, rather than a cause. In order to test for this possibility, Table
5.5 in the Appendix reports estimates of GDP levels in 1993, controlling for geography,
urbanization and human capital, with the lagged value of the municipal variable. This lagged
value is taken back to its origin circa 1825, when municipalities were organized across the
country, first as a consequence of Spain’s Cadiz Constitution in Spain and then after34
independence.
9 The lagged effect of the municipal variable is always negative and significant,
yielding results very similar those found for present-day municipalities.
The above results suggest that population density and urbanization are the variables that
exhibit the most significant and robust relationships of all, where more densely populated urban
regions are richer. This could be the result of the natural endowments of those regions, but it is
also clear that higher income represents a clear incentive for migration into those regions. In
contrast to the Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) findings at the world level, the densely
populated regions in Mexico are in the highlands, far from the coast or major waterways. Some
of the more densely populated states are also relatively small, which suggests that another reason
may underlie their performance: being small may have some advantage for development. State
size measured by population was included in unreported estimates, but it failed to be significant
once density was taken into account. Although this result would seem to undermine the
importance of natural geography for development, the results in the next series of estimates, with
indicators including GDP in 1980, growth and a poverty index, suggest that geography had
become less important by the end of the twentieth century.
Moreover, other unreported estimates of the effect of geography on municipal revenue
suggest that at a lower level of aggregation, rainfall and temperature might play a greater role
than at the state level.
10 While those other estimates are not for per capita GDP, since no such
statistics exist at the municipal level, revenue collected by municipal taxes is probably highly
correlated with the resource base and income of a given location. It is important to note that
although further research is necessary, natural geography remains an important determinant of
tax collection controlling for welfare levels as defined by an index of satisfaction of basic public
good provision in the municipality.
Before turning our attention to estimates of the effect of geography on poverty, growth
and income levels in 1980, an additional issue that we address is whether there is a relationship
between the previous results and the land types that characterize each state. In particular, Table 6
provides estimates of the effect of land types on 1993 GDP measured as the percentage of a state
territory constituting land suitable for agriculture, grazeland, forest, bush, rainforest, and other
                                                          
9 The series was constructed based on Hernández Chávez (1993), Tables 1 and 2, and attributing municipalities to
the states that were later formed out of the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and San Luis Potosí with the maps in
Archivo General de la Nación (1996).35
types of land. The results suggest that agricultural land might have a negative effect on
development, while the bush characterizing much of the North might have a positive effect. The
significance of the other land types variable is mostly related to the high GDP of Tabasco, which
is also characterized by a unique type of marshland.
Table 6. Land Types and State GDP Levels in 1997

































































































F 18.88 8.04 8.01 13.38 65.1 9.09
R2 0.8373 0.766 0.7661 0.8022 0.8162 0.7843
A final possibility, tested in Table 7 is that what really matters is not exactly the land
type, but the homogeneity of land characterizing a particular state. To test this we construct a
land type fractionalization index, which is simply the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, with the land
types of each state (grazeland, forest, bush, rainforest and other). The fractionalization index fails
to be significant, although further research could well find other alternatives to measure the
degree of land homogeneity. Table 7 also shows that a major feature of agriculture, the
organization of a state in ejidos (the traditional communal land tenure system discussed in the
historical section), correlates negatively with development, consonant with the negative sign
previously found for agriculture in equation 1 of Table 6. However, as discussed at the end of
                                                                                                                                                                                          
10 We thank Eduardo Lora for pointing out the relevance of these findings for the discussion of state-level
regressions.36
this section, such a finding is probably more related to political jurisdictions than to natural
geography.
Table 7. Fractionalization of Land Types and Ejido Organizations for Agricultural




































b) Poverty Levels in 1990
An alternative way to measure state development is not through GDP, but rather through poverty
indicators. The Appendix provides a full set of tables (Tables 5.6 through 5.9) which assess the
effect of geography on poverty levels measured through the FGT index calculated for 1990. The
FGT index constitutes an indirect poverty measure, which is based on the reported income of a
family according to census data. While more reliable income data from households surveys
exists, it is not possible to disaggregate a poverty index at the state level from that source. Hence,
the FGT index was calculated setting the poverty line at two minimum wages, and establishing in
the index a concern for the distribution of poverty by making its parameter α =2. It must be
stressed that the dependent variable is not a welfare index that includes the infrastructure and
urbanization variables as part of its components (such as INEGI’s indice de bienestar or
CONAPO’s  indice de marginación), but an indirect poverty index measured through family
earnings.37
As shown in Table 8, the basic finding is that natural geography variables are not robust,
since quality of infrastructure and human capital account for most of the variance in poverty
levels. Although at first sight location and population density seem to be important for poverty
levels, once urbanization is taken into account, with all the public good provision issues it
encompasses, those variables fail to reach significance. The bottom line in this respect is that
poverty is concentrated in rural areas, so that urbanization almost uniquely determines poverty
levels. However, a more crucial result is that the municipal variable remains important and
significant for the determination of poverty levels.
Table 8. Geographic Determinants of State Poverty Levels 1990
Dependent Variable: FGT(2,2)











































































F 11.57 14.12 23.51 87.30 20.99
R2 0.6337 0.7921 0.8568 0.9076 0.8915
An additional aspect that should be stressed is that, although the number of municipalities
is greatest in states with a strong indigenous population, such as Oaxaca, Chiapas and Puebla,
controlling for indigenous population with the variable LANGUAGE, which is the percentage of
people in a state that only speak an indigenous tongue, yields still a highly significant effect of38
political framentation on poverty. More fragmented states tend to be poorer, once we have
controlled for public good provision, human capital formation or ethnic conditions.
11
c) Growth of GDP Regressions from 1950 to 1993
In terms of the geographic determinants of GDP growth, another set of tables in the Appendix
(5.10 through 5.13) incorporate first pure geographic variables of climate, location and
population density, then urbanization effects, followed by quality of infrastructure, human
capital, and finally the number of municipalities.
Table 9 below reproduces the most important findings. In the growth regressions, all
estimates are done controlling for the initial income levels, namely, state GDP per capita in 1950.
Convergence is observed in terms of the negative and highly significant coefficient of this
variable, reflecting that initially poor states have tended to grow faster than rich ones.
Conditioning variables for this convergence are added in the spirit of the new literature on
growth so that, instead of controlling for human capital through female illiteracy as in the
previous estimates, we use the percentage of children enrolled in elementary school in 1959.
12 It
is noteworthy that among the geographic variables, population density and rainfall always
survive as determinats of growth; location on the border or along the coastline is no longer
significant. Quite surprisingly, urbanization in 1960 is not a good predictor of economic growth,
regardless of its importance in the previous estimates.
                                                          
11 One possible avenue for further research would be to use GIS data at the AGEB (Area Geoestadística Básica)
level of rainfall, location, urbanization, population density, illiteracy, language and even land use, available from
INEGI, combined with the newly released NIBA database, which provides poverty indicators also by AGEB.
12 The Appendix shows that using 1940 instead of 1959 yields basically the same result. Education has not been a
conditioning factor in the way found in much of the growth literature, although this might be to some extent a matter
of measurement, since secondary school enrollment tends to be significant in estimates.39
Table 9. Geographic Determinants of State Growth, 1950-1993
Dependent Variable: growth5093













































































Ln mun / km 0.0033509
(0.055)
F 78.14 59.91 46.42 87.11 73.22
R2 0.8979 0.8914 0.8918 0.9002 0.9002
When controlling for all these variables, the variables for fragmentation of political
jurisdictions was no longer significant. This result suggests that although initial levels of GDP in
1950 are determined by the number of jurisdictions, such a political variable does not have
effects on the margin for changes of income through time. Although further research would be
needed in order to prove this assertion, and maybe a two-state estimation procedure is called for,
this is an encouraging result for the future prospects of development in the Mexican states.
Growth regressions were also tested according to land use (according to INEGI) depending on
whether land was unsuitable for agriculture, and land types classified by agricultural, bush, forest
or rainforest. No significant results were obtained, but this could be a consequence of the level of
aggregation.40
d) GDP Levels in 1980
A relatively surprising finding in the course of this research was that geographic variables were
stronger determinants of GDP in 1980 than in 1993. Such a result was also found for regressions
carried out with GDP figures for 1950, 1960 and 1970. This might suggest that depending of the
makeup of an economy and the type of specialization that characterizes it geography might be
more or less important. In 1980 the Mexican economy was heavily reliant on oil, little diversified
in its exports, and still heavily weighted by a history of an import substitution industrialization
strategy. By 1993 radical changes had already occured in terms of a greater reliance on
manufacturing exports and an insertion into the world economy which soon would become
firmly embedded in the institutional framework of NAFTA. In a way, Mexico was a very
different country in 1980 than in 1993; in 1980 geographic variables played a stronger role.
Table 10. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels, 1980
Dependent Variable: LPIB80





































































F 26.33 38.48 102.20 150.72 185.03
R2 0.7049 0.6782 0.8422 0.8740 0.911941
As Table 10 shows, in 1980 the findings are similar to those for levels in 1993, but there
is now a very strong effect of the rainfall variable, which was not significant before. All the
equations reveal a highly significant relationship with rain, where the negative sign of RAIN
involves a lower income level for states with higher rainfall, but such a relationship reaches its
bottom at the intermediate levels of rainfall, as can be seen in Figure 5, which uses the
coefficients of this first equation to simulate the effect of rainfall. Thus in 1980 rainfall was
associated with lower income, particularly for states in the 1,000 mm range (Colima, Guerrero,
Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca and Puebla) but this effect was not important for the
extreme cases of states like Baja California (151 mm of rainfall) or Tabasco (2,297 mm).
Figure 5.





















































The significance of this finding is that trade liberalization, and in general economic
openness, seems to be an important escape rout from natural geographic handicaps. A region that
is not well endowed in terms of rainfall and location variables would seem to do worse under a
closed than an open economy, as suggested by the comparison of the 1980 and the 1993 results.
Moreover, these estimates seem to suggest that the geography of public good provision is a much
stronger and more relevant determinant of income levels in open than closed economies.
13
                                                          
13 We owe this insight to Eduardo Lora. Further research should be pursued along the lines of the effect of trade
openness on geographic determinants of income.42
e) Regional Inequality Decomposed
Table 11 provides an estimate of GINI coefficients for simulations for inequality if the deviations
of the independent variables were subtracted from their average value. That is, the exercise tells
us how much regional inequality can be attributed to the specific inequality produced in the
regression by the variance in each specific independent variable. The exercise is carried out
incrementally, so that the first variable which is discounted is rainfall, to obtain a predicted
dependent variable (GDP levels, growth or the poverty index), and then a GINI index to capture
the overall distribution, without the rainfall effects. The next line in the table generates a new
GINI coefficient for the previous predicted value subtracting the border effect, then population
density, and so forth. Hence the last line of each estimate represents, in fact, a residual inequality
that is not accounted for when the variances of all the independent variables have been
eliminated.
Table 11. GINI Coefficients Isolating Effects of Explanatory Variables
(Cumulative effects)
LGDP80 LGDP93 GROWTH FGT22
Dependent variable (Y) 0.2605 0.2834 0.2142 0.2285
- average
rainfall









0.1813 0.2339 0.2093 0.2518










- initial GDP 0.088443
Table 12 now provides the percentage of inequality which is cumulatively produced by
“neutralizing” each of the independent variables on top of the previous one.
Table 12. Relative Contribution to Inequality Measured by GINI Index
(Cumulative effects, as percentage of dependent variable GINI)
LGDP80 LGDP93 GROWTH FGT22
Rain -7.4 -4.3 5.0 0.2
Border -0.9 2.1 -9.2
Coast 2.3
Density 36.9 19.7 -5.1 47.4
Urban 36.0 21.6 3.8
Illiteracy 6.6 13.2 16.8
School 0.0
Municipal 5.6 7.9 10.7
Initialgdp 52.7
Unaccounted 21.5 39.8 41.3 35.5
It is clear that the most prominent contribution to income inequality is made by
urbanization, which is highly correlated with all the public good variables (water, electricity,
sewage). When the urbanization effect is discounted, the GINI coefficient is smaller. This means
that the distribution of public goods in Mexico has actually enhanced regional inequality.
Although there has been a tendency for some convergence in the provision of public goods
across states throughout the whole century, this means that the policies that have provided those
goods have, nonetheless, generated greater regional inequality. It is important to note that this
effect remains controlling for density, which is the other variable that contributes most to
inequality, which means that such an effect of urbanization is related to public goods, not just to
the mobility of population through migration towards more attractive geographic locations.
Average rainfall has the opposite effect, in that when the rainfall effect is neutralized, inequality
increases. Such an effect, is however, relatively small.
6. The Meaning of Municipalities
A question arises as to the precise meaning of the municipalities variable. One could argue that
the number of jurisdictions is unrelated to geography, but produced by policy variables or an
optimal size given by economic processes. Moreover, there is an issue as to whether an
endogeneity problem exists in the previous findings. The remarkable aspect of this variable is
that the number of municipalities has been quite constant during the last two centuries. Tables 1344
and 14 show the evolution of municipalites in Mexico. The first table provides estimates for the
number of municipalities by state in 1825, 1917 and today. The second provides more detailed
information concerning municipalities in 1917 and the information that exists on what
institutional arrangement immediately preceding them in the nineteenth century.
Table 13. Number of Municipalities by State
1825 1917 1999






Coahuila 4 37 38
Colima 1 81 0
Chiapas 59 111
Chihuahua 2 64 67
Distrito Federal 1 13 16
Durango 2 43 39
Guanajuato 14 33 46
Guerrero 33 67 76
Hidalgo 63 84
Jalisco 15 124
México 72 118 122
Michoacán 90 75 113
Morelos 17 33
Nayarit 1 17 20
Nuevo León 7 49 51
Oaxaca 200 570
Puebla 172 142 217
Querétaro 6 18
Quintana Roo 18 8




Tamaulipas 7 37 43
Tlaxcala 42 44 60
Veracruz 6 183 207
Yucatán 160 106
Zacatecas 3 50 56
2,749 3,160 4,427
Sources: For 1825, Hernández Chávez (1993) in bold type and Secretaría de Gobernación (1996) in italics;
for 1917 INEGI (1997); for 1999, Cedemun (1999).45
Table 14. Evolution of Territorial Division from the Late Nineteenth Century
to the Twentieth Century
Municipalities before 1917 Municipalities in 1917
Aguascalientes (18/10/1868) divided into 4 partidos 8 municipios libres
Baja California n.d n.a.
Baja California Sur n.d n.a
Campeche (13/07/1877) divided into 5 partidos 8 municipios libres
Coahuila (20/12/1868) divided into 5 distritos 6 distritos judiciales and 37 municipios libres
Colima (13/07/1867) 2 partidos and 6 municipalidades 8 municipios libres
Chiapas (05/02/1857) divided into 7 departamentos 59 municipios libres
Chihuahua (1867) 5 distritos and 17 cantones 64 municipios libres
Distrito Federal (05/02/1857) 1 municipalidad and 4 partidos 13 municipalidades
Durango (1867) divided into 13 partidos 43 municipios libres
Guanajuato (05/02/1857)  5 deptos and 20 municipalidades 33 municipios libres
Guerrero (18/05/1847) 4 distritos 15 distritos and 67 municipios libres
Hidalgo (16/01/1869) 11 distritos n.a.
Jalisco (30/12/1836) 8 dsitritos and 19 partidos (22/08/1864) 8 cantones and 28 departamentos.
México (14/10/1870) 16 distritos 118 municipios libres
Michoacán (1867) 17 distritos, 75 municipalidades, 216 tenencias (24/04/1868) 17 distritos, 75 municipalidades, 216 tenencias
Morelos (17/04/1869) 5 distritos n.a.
Nayarit (12/12/1884) 6 partidos 17 municipios libres
Nuevo León (22/08/1846) 3 distritos, 7 partidos, 31 municipalidades 49 municipalidades and 1 congregación
Oaxaca (05/02/1857) 25 distritos and 22 partidos 50 municipal departments
Puebla (14/12/1853) divided into 24 partidos (1867) 18 distritos and 142 municipalidades
Querétaro (18/01/1869) 6 dsitritos 6 municipios libres
Quintana Roo (24/11/1902) 2 prefecturas n.a.
San Luis Potosí (24/05/1869) 3 partidos and 52 municipalidades 55 municipios libres
Sinaloa (03/03/1865) 2 departamentos 16 municipios libres
Sonora (14/05/1869) 9 distritos 76 municipios libres
Tabasco (18/12/1883) 17 municipalidades 17 municipalidades
Tamaulipas (05/02/1857) 3 dsitritos and 11 partidos 37 municipios libres
Tlaxcala (03/03/1865) 5 dsitritos and 27 municipalidades 44 municipios
Veracruz (05/02/1857) 18 cantones 183 municipios libres
Yucatán (05/02/1857) 13 partidos n.a.
Zacatecas (1867) 12 partidos 50 municipalidades
Source: INEGI (1997).46
Figure 6 shows just how resilient political jurisdictions in Mexico seem to be, in that for
those states where data is readily available, the correlation between municipalities in 1917 and
1999 is very high.
Figure 6.
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Finally, Table 15 reports that the number of municipalities in 1825 is a very good
predictor of municipalities 170 years later, particularly if controls are introduced for population
at the turn of the last century (POB1893) and the territory measured in square kilometers. Table
15 also reports that climate and location variables do not explain the number of municipalities,
when the initial number is controlled for. However, as the last estimate in the table shows, when
the initial number of municipalities is not included in the estimation, the variables of rainfall and
coastline are important determinants of number of municipalities. More jurisdictions exist in the
coast and at middle ranges of rainfall. Further exploration with topographical measures might
reveal that the number of municipalities is quite geographically determined, although we believe
that the basic thrust of this variable is political. Municipalities can be taken as a useful proxy of a
historical lock-in phenomenon that incorporates geography and political incentives, and the
numbers should be taken seriously as a determinant of income levels.47
Table 15. Historical Origin of Number of Municipalities
Dependent Variable: Munic





































































F 7.19 6.22 5.06 3.73 3.39 2.93
R2 0.5783 0.6838 0.6972 0.6957 0.7916 0.5343
How do we understand this process to have developed?   Mexico’s natural ecology shows
several distinct regions that very early affected population patterns.  During pre-Hispanic times,
the available primitive technologies limited large populations to areas where sufficient food was
easily produced.  This meant that those regions with stocks of water, rich soils and appropriate
temperature were first settled, while less well endowed areas remained relatively vacant.  These
more favorable areas were the Michoacan and Guanajuato lakes region, the central Valley of
Mexico, the Valley of Oaxaca, small areas in the Veracruz midlands and the tropical Mayan
region.  Northern Mexico was sparsely populated by nomads, while jungles and mountains were
left as refuge areas to weaker and smaller nations.
The sixteenth century Spanish conquest introduced new technologies and institutions in
Mexico.  The victorious Spaniards, however, immediately became overlords and began
extracting the rents that had formerly been controlled by the dominant Indian groups.  The
demographic catastrophe
14 that followed the military conquest required that if rent extraction
                                                          
14 The population dropped in the sixteenth century from somewhere around 20 million Indians in 1520 to barely 2
million in 1600.48
were to be continued, the Indian population had to be carefully controlled and kept in one
geograhical location. This meant that both institutions and policies had to be adapted to the new
low-density reality.  Individuals, now fewer in number, became more valuable and had to be
confined to the land which they made productive.  Allied Indian chieftains were given townships
and territorial jurisdictions to govern and from which extract rents.  These entities maintained the
indigenous communal land tenure system and in time became the origin of most municipalities in
central Mexico.  Spaniards, on the other hand, were given encomiendas (land grants) and
repartimientos de indios
15 (site-specific allocations of indigenous labor in an arrangement similar
to serfdom) to make these lands productive. This practice became the origin of the large
haciendas and of new settlements in the newly opened regions. Mexico’s economic development
has thus displayed since its begining the seeds of two very different models: one based solely on
rent extraction of existing resources, in populated central Mexico, and the other based on new
technologies, stock accumulation and productivity increases in geographic regions opened by the
insertion of Mexico into the Spanish-European colonial economy, and centuries later by its
insertion into the world and global economies.
Municipalities thus developed in two very different ecological settings with different
results. Where population density was high because of propitious natural conditions for the
production of food by the available primitive technologies (the central Valleys of Mexico and
Oaxaca, the midlands of Veracruz and the lake regions of Michoacan and Guanajuato),
municipalities became efficient rent-extracting mechanisms. Where population density was low,
because of poorer natural conditions, the introduction of new food-producing technologies
(western agriculture techniques, irrigation and/or extensive cattle raising) or the discovery of
valuable mining resources, municipal institutions contributed to faster colonization, population
growth and economic development.  The institutional “lock-in” phenomenon would seem to
explain the negative correlation found between the number of municipalities and economic
wealth.
Although further research is called for on this topic, one immediate question arises as to
whether some of the “lock-in” phenomena of the institutional ecology might be correlated. That
is, it could well be that the number of municipalities is correlated to the historical conformation
                                                          
15 Encomiendas had the purpose of christianizing the indians by having them under the tutorship of “old Ohristians”
who had to provide education and religious instruction. Repartimientos were established as rewards to the Spanish
soldiers who contributed to the conquest of Mexico by giving them whole Indian towns to exploit and benefit from.49
of tax authority and the organization of production in agriculture as reflected by ejidos. Although
we do not attempt to probe into the possibility that all of these variables might be measuring an
underlying institutional density, Table 16 shows that this is a definite possibility as reflected by
the correlation matrix of the number of ejidos, the locations of taxes on trade in 1810
(alcabalas), and the number of municipalities in 1917, 1825 and today. The low correlation
between ejidos and municipalities in 1825 at their original inception suggests that these variables
measure different phenomena, or that at least the current number of ejidos is vary different from
what it might have been originally. The alcabala posts in 1810 show a very high correlation with
the number of all municipalities variables, which suggests that the multiplication of political
jurisdictions might be concurrent with the establishment of tax authority. However, this is mostly
speculation, since further research is necessary in order to ascertain these relations.
Table 16. Correlation Matrix of the Number of Municipalities
and Other Institutional Density Variables
ejidos alcab810 mun1917 munic mun1825
Ejidos 1
alcab810 0.5074 1
mun1917 0.7547 0.7537 1
Munic 0.7334 0.7689 0.9592 1
mun1825 0.1861 0.7892 0.5673 0.6879 1
A final important issue is whether the number of municipalities provides an explanation
for the deficient provision of local public goods in vast regions in Mexico. As Table 17 shows,
estimates using the percentage of homes with sewage, water, electricity, where indigenous
languages are spoken or the degree of female illiteracy in 1990 fail miserably to be explained by
the number of municipalities. Perhaps as much of a surprise comes from observing that initial
GDP does not provide an explanation either. We believe the problem with this estimates lies in
the level of analysis, and that a more disaggregated approach might prove to be a fruitful avenue
for further research, since it is quite likely that fragmentation of localities, for example, within a
municipality explains quite a lot of the deficiency in public good provision.50
Table 17. Municipalities as an Explanation for Public Good Provision







































































F 3.87 14.76 2.97 1.49 8.32
R2 0.5046 0.6084 0.4535 0.4366 0.6794
7. Policy Implications and Research Agenda
Mexico’s past as a colonial society, based on natural resource exports, namely silver, produced
rent-seeking political institutions to serve a predatory elite that had no incentives to compete.
The oil booms in the 1920s and 1970s were not altogether so different, in that natural resource
exports did not produce an endogenous process of development. Instead, the country was
characterized by a great institutional density. This would be reflected in internal barriers to trade
which made exchange even more difficult than what the already important natural barriers
entailed. Thus Mexico has been primarily a fragmented, closed, protected economy. At the
regional level, only when transport costs declined with the arrival of the railroad, at the end of
the nineteenth century, did the North begin accelerated growth that was open and subject to
competition, and subsequently reflected in political demands. The North took advantage of the
existence of coal in northern Coahuila, and Monterrey started its industrialization. This
development can only be explained by a crucial locational factor, namely the shared border with
the United States. Geographic destiny plays a key role in the development prospects in the
country even today, as NAFTA determines much of the dynamic growth of mid-size cities in the
North of the country.
Geography has played key roles in development at various moments. The ease of
maritime transport through steamers, together with the tropical climate, allowed for the
development of plantation economies, for example in Yucatan (henequen), Veracruz (sugar) and51
Chiapas (coffee), accompanied by the emergence of authoritarian semi-slavery political
institutions. The political and demographic center of the country specialized in incipient
manufactures and traditional foodstuffs for the national market, which was kept relatively closed
due to transport barriers. Coastlines remained relatively unpopulated due to the risk of malaria.
This pattern of regional development has long-lasting effects that are still felt today.
While the relatively young cities of the North have become thoroughly integrated into global
production and trade networks, creating democratic political institutions that are conducive to
citizen participation and involvement, the Gulf states are still backward not only in economic but
also political terms. Large populations have been excluded from the benefits of free trade and
markets.This is due largely to historical privations, to which one must add isolated geographies,
harsh climatic conditions, and public policies that have not been able to extend the benefits of
urbanization, literacy and communication to those areas. Poverty in Mexico is, in fact, closely
related to geography, although the exact characteristics of this relationship are still a topic that
merits much future research.
This paper has attempted to put geograhic determinants of development into perspective,
using mostly state-level information in the case of Mexico. However, the main findings point
towards the need to engage in a more local level of analysis that should first concentrate on
municipalities and then probably move on to localities within each political jurisdiction.
On the other hand, we have stressed the role of institutional ecology in the way in which
geography can determine development by promoting the creation of some types of political
institutions rather than others. While much of this remains a hypothesis rather than a proved
relationship, a very important area of future research constitutes being able to characterize local
political institutions at the municipal level in a meaningful way, seeking to find whether the
relationship with geography holds at that level of analysis.
Further studies should provide an empirical basis for formulating population policy.  At
present, the Mexican population has largely settled in areas that are not geographically adequate.
Most Mexicans live at more than 3,000 feet above sea level.  In addition, a large portion of the
population lives in mountainous areas with difficult communications, and a growing number is
invading the southern tropical rain forests.  All of these settlement patterns indicate the existence
of institutions that are providing the wrong signals to social actors. This suggests that study
should be devoted to the feasibility of policies to improve health conditions along the coastline,52
perhaps promoting migration towards the sea. This would involve promoting the “revolution” of
air conditioners and the construction of means of communications towards the coasts and the
borders, which seem to be natural areas for growth in the coming years.
The provision of public goods in new settlements on the coasts and lowlands would
probably require the creation of statutes, incentives and financial instruments to facilitate a
gradual population flow into places with adequate services. The results we have provided in the
paper show that urbanization and its correlates (electricity, sewage and water) play a key role in
the development prospect, controlling for other variables. The way in which geographic
conditions might make the provision of local public goods more or less difficult is a topic that
merits futher research.
Recent political developments in Mexico point towards a trend for a greater
decentralization of decision-making to the municipal levels, especially on those issues connected
with fiscal sovereignty and regulation. This is another major area of future research, since one
can think of policies that might promote the competition of different institutional models
prevailing in different regions. For example, one can imagine that innovative policies that
sacrifice current revenue collection in order to reward efficiency and later increase future tax
collection could be strategically proposed by municipal authorities and then, when they are
successful, become diffused through imitation.
An additional area that merits further research, and one with important policy
implications, is the need for ecology audits (both natural and institutional) to understand the
hidden and overt costs that Mexico is paying for maintaining its current set of institutions and
exploiting its natural resources. This should be done at the state and municipal levels, as well as
regionally, in order to understand interjurisdictional spillover effects.
But the most prominent area where we believe a fruitful analysis of the effects of
geography in development should be carried out is poverty and geographic poverty traps.
Poverty is usually concentrated in specific places, which share common characteristics not only
in the relative deprivation of public goods and services, but also in the natural resources and
political institutions that prevail. Understanding whether there are policy prescriptions of what
needs to be done to open up those poverty traps, thus removing barriers to many Mexicans’
sharing in the benefits of an open economy, is one of the greatest tasks ahead.53
Those barriers could be natural, such as rivers, forests or mountains, or linguistic and
cultural, but they could well be man-made in terms of unintended effects of current public good
provision policies and even poverty relief efforts. These barriers might also represent a
byproduct of greater decentralization, which might entrench predatory political elites in poor
regions. If researchers could gain further insight into the way in which poverty and destitution
can be alleviated within a sophisticated understanding of geographic conditions and local public
goods, they might have important prescriptions to offer to governments and policymakers in the
most important topic for social development.54
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Appendix. Descriptive Profile of GDP and Geography in Mexico and Full Set of Results for
Section 5
Table 1. Mexican Regional GDP by Latitude Band
State State GDP 97 Population 97 TOTAL per capita GDP
Latitude
28-32
Baja California 19568227.82 2249968                       7,555.74
Sonora 21041600.68 2157252
Chihuahua 14546691.24 2892725
TOTAL    55,156,519.75        7,299,945
24-28




Nuevo León 51582303.9 3680565
Tamaulipas 20402011.77 2602891
TOTAL  121,556,468.43      12,841,159
20-24









TOTAL  138,642,979.54      21,395,729
16-20













Quintana Roo 11225134.37 766895
TOTAL  482,318,571.01      53,195,48758
Table 2. Mexican Regional GDP by Temperature
State State GDP 97 Population 97 TOTAL per capita GDP
Temperature
10-18
Aguascalientes 7028804.284 900551                      12,497.05
DF 191902943.4 8519305
Edo México 83899081.79 12198634
Querétaro 10719840.48 1309470
Tlaxcala 4438425.173 916800
TOTAL  297,989,095.10      23,844,760
10-22









TOTAL  164,139,888.66      24,746,647
10-26






Nuevo León 51582303.9 3680565
Oaxaca 13668961.72 3420659
TOTAL  220,786,474.23      32,122,049
18-26
Baja California S 3714582.643 398437                       7,982.54
Baja California 19568227.82 2249968
Colima 5025784.63 502887





TOTAL    87,852,542.88      11,005,584
26 or more
Campeche 13060255.18 671343                       9,950.01
Tabasco 11769477.8 1824104
TOTAL    24,829,732.98        2,495,44759
Table 3. Mexican Regional GDP by Ranges of Rainfall
State State GDP 97 Population 97 TOTAL per capita GDP
Rainfall
0-600
Baja California 19568227.82 2249968                       8,592.03





TOTAL    79,940,659.57        9,304,047
300-1000
Querétaro 10719840.48 1309470                       7,842.86
San Luis Potosí 17624673.11 2275205
Guanajuato 15794298.38 4588751
Tlaxcala 4438425.173 916800
Nuevo León 51582303.9 3680565
TOTAL  100,159,541.04      12,770,791
300-2000















TOTAL  488,952,064.56      48,893,867
300-4000






TOTAL  126,545,468.68      23,245,78260
Table 4. Regional GDP / squared km.
GDP 1997 km 2 GDP / km 2
México 83,899,081.79 21,355 3,928,779.29
Morelos 12,834,899.05 4,950 2,592,908.90
Aguascalientes 7,028,804.28 5,471 1,284,738.49
Tlaxcala 4,438,425.17 4,016 1,105,185.55
Colima 5,025,784.63 5,191 968,172.73
Querétaro 10,719,840.48 11,449 936,312.38
Nuevo León 51,582,303.90 64,924 794,502.86
Puebla 25,682,516.08 33,902 757,551.65
Jalisco 52,495,308.18 80,836 649,405.07
Hidalgo 12,656,466.73 20,813 608,103.91
Veracruz 39,371,891.79 71,699 549,127.49
Guanajuato 15,794,298.38 30,491 517,998.70
Tabasco 11,769,477.80 25,627 459,260.85
Guerrero 27,795,199.84 64,281 432,401.48
Chiapas 23,396,154.57 74,211 315,265.32
Michoacán 18,247,845.66 59,928 304,496.16
Baja California 19,568,227.82 69,921 279,861.96
San Luis Potosí 17,624,673.11 63,068 279,455.08
Yucatán 10,084,780.46 38,402 262,610.81
Campeche 13,060,255.18 50,812 257,030.92
Tamaulipas 20,402,011.77 79,384 257,004.08
Sinaloa 14,117,438.54 58,328 242,035.36
Quintana Roo 11,225,134.37 50,212 223,554.82
Nayarit 5,791,387.52 26,979 214,662.79
Coahuila 22,140,023.74 149,982 147,617.87
Oaxaca 13,668,961.72 93,952 145,488.78
Sonora 21,041,600.68 182,052 115,580.17
Zacatecas 6,447,420.40 73,252 88,016.99
Durango 9,600,107.84 123,181 77,934.97
Chihuahua 14,546,691.24 244,938 59,389.28
Baja California Sur 3,714,582.64 73,475 50,555.7461
Table 5. Mexican Regional GDP by Index of Trade Mobility
State GDP Population Total per capita GDP
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Quintana Roo 11,225,134.37 766,895
Baja California S 3,714,582.64 398,437
Total 108,907,816.56 14,985,122
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Nuevo León 51,582,303.90 3,680,565
Sonora 21,041,600.68 2,157,252
Baja California 19,568,227.82 2,249,968
Total 304,666,223.67 39,761,642
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Full Set of Results for Section 5
Table 5.1. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels, 1993
Dependent Variable: LPIB93

































































F 4.08 4.85 3.87 6.06 6.55
R2 0.4349 0.4518 0.3805 0.4195 0.4964
Table 5.2. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels 1993,
Including Infrastructure
Dependent Variable: LPIB93























































































































F 6.55 13.32 16.29 10.98 21.33 10.35 14.38 16.5 11.66
R2 0.4964 0.7073 0.5743 0.5969 0.7085 0.7075 0.7079 0.7297 0.743363














































F 13.32 19.96 11.69
R2 0.7073 0.7416 0.7538
Table 5.4. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels 1993, Municipal Effects
Dependent Variable: LPIB93













































































































F 102.20 241.99 233.36 143.80 97.78 203.05 185.03
R2 0.8422 0.8665 0.8777 0.8968 0.8849 0.9094 0.911964


















































F 155.58 172.08 160.18
R2 0.8626 0.8801 0.8730
Table 5.6. Dependent Variable: fgt22























































F 11.57 8.35 9.30 9.46
R2 0.6337 0.6164 0.6336 0.506865
Table 5.7. Dependent Variable: fgt22













































































































F 14.12 12.46 13.30 14.46 16.31 9.03 21.06 10.97
R2 0.7921 0.8119 0.8066 0.8394 0.8225 0.6896 0.7043 0.8444














































F 23.51 52.67 44.32
R2 0.8568 0.8677 0.872466
Table 5.9. Dependent Variable: fgt22





























































































F 14.12 58.82 27.58 37.76 87.30 20.99
R2 0.7921 0.8838 0.9004 0.9017 0.9076 0.8915











































































F 78.14 48.07 56.48 59.91 51.02
R2 0.8979 0.8912 0.8907 0.8914 0.88667
















































F 46.42 41.15 87.11
R2 0.8918 0.8943 0.9002

























































F 110.65 77.97 73.22
R2 0.9271 0.9335 0.900268
Table 5.13. Geographic Determinants of State GDPLevels 1980
Dependent Variable: LPIB80

































































F 26.33 31.98 25.89 37.45 38.48
R2 0.7049 0.7048 0.6325 0.6282 0.6782
Table 5.14. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels 1980, Including
Infrastructure
Dependent Variable: LPIB80





















































































































F 38.48 102.20 71.35 95.58 163.93 87.72 95.15 118.98 115.43
R2 0.6782 0.8422 0.7683 0.7859 0.8524 0.8424 0.8463 0.8617 0.865169














































F 102.20 150.72 124.81
R2 0.8422 0.8740 0.8740
Table 5.16. Geographic Determinants of State GDP Levels 1980, Municipal Effects
Dependent Variable: LPIB80













































































































F 102.20 241.99 233.36 143.80 97.78 203.05 185.03
R2 0.8422 0.8665 0.8777 0.8968 0.8849 0.9094 0.9119